La racionalidad de las teorías conspirativas. Una aproximación desde Max Weber y Raymond Boudon
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54790/rccs.24Palabras clave:
Teorías conspirativas, Elección racional, Racionalidad cognitiva, Max Weber, Raymond BoudonResumen
Las teorías conspirativas suelen ser percibidas como fenómenos ideológicos irracionales con potencial para producir efectos perniciosos en las sociedades donde se propagan. Esta percepción, reforzada por la visibilidad de los ejemplos históricos en que han legitimado la discriminación de minorías o incluso el genocidio, condiciona el análisis sociológico de las mismas y limita su potencial explicativo cuando parte de una presunción de irracionalidad. Este artículo defiende, por el contrario, una aproximación que parte de una presunción de racionalidad, concebida en un sentido amplio en el que se conjugan la racionalidad instrumental y la racionalidad valorativa. Un enfoque de elección racional así planteado permite una comprensión más completa del fenómeno y, con ella, potencialmente una base más sólida para intervenir respecto a los objetivos normativos a los que no renuncia. El artículo contrasta la visión restringida de la racionalidad de Pareto con las de Weber y Boudon, en tanto son aplicables a las teorías conspirativas, y examina las conexiones que estas presentan con las creencias religiosas de acuerdo con Popper. A continuación, detalla los distintos enfoques racionales que admite el fenómeno y esboza una propuesta teórica para conciliar las dos corrientes principales en el estudio sociológico de las teorías conspirativas.
Descargas
Métricas
Citas
Aaronovitch, D. (2009). Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History. London: Jonathan Cape.
Albertson, B. y Kimberley, G. (2020). Conspiracy theories, election rigging, and support for democratic norms. Research & Politics, 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020959859
Ben-Itto, H. (2020). The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of Elders of Zion. London: Vallentine Mitchell.
Bierwiaczonek, K., Gundersen, A. B. y Kunst, J. R. (2022). The role of conspiracy beliefs for COVID-19 health responses: A meta-analysis. Current Opinion in Psychology, 46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101346
Birchall, C. (2006). Knowledge goes pop: From conspiracy theory to gossip. Oxford: Berg. https://doi.org/10.26530/OAPEN_390769
Boltanski, L. (2012). Énigmes et complots: une enquête à propos d’enquêtes. Paris: Gallimard. https://doi.org/10.14375/NP.9782070136292
Boudon, R. (1986). L’idéologie ou l’origine des idées reçues. Paris: Fayard.
Boudon, R. (1990). L’art de se persuader des idées douteuses, fragiles ou fausses. Paris: Fayard.
Boudon, R. (1996). The «cognitivist model»: a generalized «rational-choice model». Rationality and Society, 8, 123-150. https://doi.org/10.1177/104346396008002001
Boudon, R. (1998). Études sur les sociologues classiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Boudon, R. (2000). Études sur les sociologues classiques II. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Boudon, R (2001). The Origin of Values. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Boudon, R. (2003). Beyond rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100213
Boudon, R. (2004). La sociología que realmente importa. Papers, 72, 215-226. https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/papers/v72n0.1133
Boudon, R. (2008). How can axiological feelings be explained? International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 18(3), 349-364. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906700802376412
Boudon, R. y Borricaud, F. (2004). Dictionnaire critique de la sociologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Bratich, J. (2008). Conspiracy panics: Political rationality and popular culture. State University of New York Press.
Brotherton, R. (2015). Suspicious minds: Why we believe conspiracy theories. New York: Bloomsbury. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472944528
Butter, M. (2020). The Nature of Conspiracy Theories. Cambridge: Polity Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-5_10
Byford, J. (2015). Conspiracy theories: A critical introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Chesterton, G. K. (1986). Collected Works Vol. I: Heretics, Orthodoxy, The Blatchford Controversies. San Francisco: Ignatius Press [ediciones originales: 1905, 1908 y 1904, respectivamente].
Chomsky, N. (2004). On historical amnesia, foreign policy and Iraq. American Amnesia, 17 de febrero.
Clarke, S. (2007). Conspiracy theories and the internet: Controlled demolition and arrested development. Episteme, 4(2), 167-180. https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2007.4.2.167
Coady, D. (2012). What to Believe Now. Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Cohn, N. (2010). El mito de la conspiración judía mundial. Los Protocolos de los Sabios de Sión. Madrid: Alianza.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. London: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press.
Dentith, M. R. (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363169
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S. y Deravi, F. (2019). Understanding conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 40(S1), 3-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12568
Dyrendal, A. (2020). Conspiracy theory and religion. En M. Butter y P. Knight, Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories (pp. 371-383). London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-3_9
Enders, A. y Smallpage, S. (2019). Informational cues, partisan-motivated reasoning, and the manipulation of conspiracy beliefs. Political Communication, 36(1), 83-102. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1493006
Enders, A., Smallpage, S. y Lupton, R. (2020). Are all ‘birthers’ conspiracy theorists? On the relationship between conspiratorial thinking and political orientations. British Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 849-866. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000837
Fenster, M. (1999). Conspiracy theories: Secrecy and power in American culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Freeman, D., Waite, F., Rosebrock, L., Petit, A., Causier, C., East, A., et al. (2022). Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mistrust, and compliance with government guidelines in England. Psychological Medicine, 52(2), 251-263. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291720001890
Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15(4), 733-744. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791630
Goffman, E. (1956). The presentation of self in everyday life. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press.
Harambam, J. y Aupers, S. (2021). From the unbelievable to the undeniable: Epistemological pluralism, or how conspiracy theorists legitimate their extraordinary truth claims. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 24(4), 990-1008. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549419886045
Hofstadter, R. (1965). The paranoid style in American politics and other essays. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Husting, G. y Orr, M. (2007). Dangerous machinery: “Conspiracy theorist” as a transpersonal strategy of exclusion. Symbolic Interaction, 127-150. https://doi.org/10.1525/si.2007.30.2.127
Kalberg, S. (1980). Max Weber’s types of rationality: cornerstones for the analysis of rationalization processes in history. American Journal of Sociology, 85(5), 1145-1179. https://doi.org/10.1086/227128
Knight, P. (2000). Conspiracy culture: From the Kennedy assassination to the X-Files. London: Routledge.
Leveaux, S., Nera, K., Fagnoni, P. y Klein, P. P. L. E. (2022). Defining and Explaining Conspiracy Theories: Comparing the Lay Representations of Conspiracy Believers and Non-Believers. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/9p2ca
Locke, S. (2009). Conspiracy culture, blame culture, and rationalisation. Sociological Review, 57, 567-585. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2009.01862.x
Mancosu, M., Vassallo, S. y Vezzoni, C. (2017). Believing in conspiracy theories: evidence from an exploratory analysis of Italian survey data. South European Society and Politics, 22(3), 327-344. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2017.1359894
Melley, T. (2000). Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America. London: Cornell University Press.
Miller, J., Saunders, K. y Farhart, C. E. (2016). Conspiracy endorsement as motivated reasoning: the moderating roles of political knowledge and trust. American Journal of Political Science, 60(4), 824-844. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12234
Nefes, T. S. (2013). Political parties’ perceptions and uses of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Turkey. Sociological Review, 61, 247-264. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12016
Nefes, T. S. (2014). Rationale of conspiracy theorizing: Who shot the president Chen Shui-bian? Rationality and Society, 373-394. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463113519069
Nefes, T. S. y Romero Reche, A. (2020). Sociology, Social Theory and Conspiracy Theory. En M. Butter y P. Knight, Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories (pp. 94-107). London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429452734-1_7
Nyhan, B. y Zeitzoff, T. (2018). Conspiracy and misperception belief in the Middle East and North Africa. The Journal of Politics, 80(4), 1400-1404. https://doi.org/10.1086/698663
Pareto, V. (1964 [1916]). Trattato di sociologia generale. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità.
Pasek, J., Stark, T., Krosnick, J. y Tompson, T. (2015). What motivates a conspiracy theory? Birther beliefs, partisanship, liberal-conservative ideology, and anti-Black attitudes. Electoral Studies, 40, 482-489. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.09.009
Pipes, D. (1997). Conspiracy: How the paranoid style flourishes and where it comes from. New York: Free Press.
Popper, K. R. (1984). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy. Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. R. (2002). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Preston, P. (2021). Arquitectos del terror. Franco y los artífices del odio. Barcelona: Debate.
Prooijen, J. W. y Jostmann, N. B. (2013). Belief in conspiracy theories: the influence of uncertainty and perceived morality. European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 109-115. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1922
Pummerer, L., Böhm, R., Lilleholt, L., Winter, K., Zettler, I. y Sassenberg, K. (2022). Conspiracy theories and their societal effects during the COVID-19 pandemic. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 13(1), 49-59. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506211000217
Reichstadt, R. (2019). L’opium des imbéciles. Essai sur la question complotiste. Paris: Bernard Grasset.
Rogin, M. (1987). Ronald Reagan the Movie and Other Episodes of Political Demonology. Berkeley: University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520908994
Rothschild, M. (2021). The Storm is Upon Us. How QAnon Became a Movement, Cult, and Conspiracy Theory of Everything. London: Melville House.
Southworth, H. R. (2002). Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War. The Brainwashing of Francisco Franco. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203465837
Sutton, R. y Douglas, K. (2022). Rabbit Hole Syndrome: Inadvertent, accelerating and entrenched commitment to conspiracy beliefs. Current Opinion in Psychology (en prensa). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101462
Swami, V. y Furnham, A. (2012). Examining conspiracist beliefs about the disappearance of Amelia Earhart. Journal of General Psychology, 139, 244- 259. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.2012.697932
Swami, V., Pietschnig, J., Ulrich, S. T. et al. (2013). Lunar lies: the impact of informational framing and individual differences in shaping conspiracist beliefs about the moon landings. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27, 71-80. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2873
Ullah, I., Khan, K. S., Tahir, M. J., Ahmed, A. y Harapan, H. (2021). Myths and conspiracy theories on vaccines and COVID-19: Potential effect on global vaccine refusals. Vacunas, 22(2), 93-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vacun.2021.01.001
Uscinski, J. y Parent, J. (2014). American conspiracy theories. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001
Uscinski, J., Klofstad, C. y Atkinson, M. (2016). What drives conspiratorial beliefs? The role of informational cues and predispositions. Political Research Quarterly, 69(1), 57-71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915621621
Van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., Azevedo, F. y Jost, J. H. (2021). The paranoid style in American politics revisited: An ideological asymmetry in conspiratorial thinking. Political Psychology, 42(1), 23-51. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12681
Weber, M. (1993 [1922]). Economía y sociedad. Esbozo de sociología comprensiva. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Weber, M. (2001 [1905]). La ética protestante y el «espíritu» del capitalismo. Madrid: Alianza.
Weber, M. (2009). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge.
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M. y Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(6), 767-773. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611434786
Woods, P. (2001). Values-intuitive rational action: the dynamic relationship of instrumental rationality and values insights as a form of social action. The British Journal of Sociology, 52(4), 687-706. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071310120084535
Descargas
Publicado
Cómo citar
Número
Sección
Licencia
Derechos de autor 2022 Alejandro Romero Reche, Türkay Salim Nefes
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
